



# Optimization of Privacy-Utility Trade-offs under Informational Self-determination\*

Presented

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[\\*https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.03186](https://arxiv.org/abs/1710.03186)

# UN Sustainability Goals





The UN Development Group has issued general guidance on data privacy, data protection and data ethics concerning the use of big data...




# Common Data Flows: No privacy

$s_i \in \mathcal{S}$ , actual values



Data Producers

$g(\mathcal{S}) \in \mathbb{R}^1$   
aggregation



Data Consumer

# Masking Data: Privacy Setting

Masking is an elementwise operation:

$$f(s_i; \theta) = m_i \iff F(S; \theta) = M$$

$f$ : masking mechanism

$s_i$ : sensor value

$\theta$ : masking parameters

$m_i$ : masked value

# Privacy Preserving Masking

$$f(s_i; \theta) = s_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Privacy evaluation metrics ( $q$ ) are calculated based on  $\varepsilon_i$

E.g. Variance of  $\varepsilon_i$  values

# Utility

Preserved benefit of data consumer operation on masked data:


$$g(\mathbb{M}) = g(\mathbb{S}) + \delta, \delta \rightarrow 0$$

Utility evaluation metrics ( $u$ ) calculated based on  $\delta$ .

E.g. accuracy of masked total load in a smart grid

# Current Data Flows: Engineering Privacy


$S$ : actual values



$$F(S; \theta^*)$$



$g(M)$   
Masked value  
aggregates



Data Producers

Data Consumer

# Selection of Masking Mechanisms

## Challenges:

1. Evaluation criteria & comparison
2. Optimization
3. Constraints by user preferences





# Multiple Masking Mechanisms

## Solutions



1. Privacy  $q$  and Utility  $u$ , usually  $q$  is independent or opposing to  $u$  (Aggarwal, 2008)
2. Measure and compare trade-off (Aggarwal, 2008)
3. Optimize trade-off, NP-Hard (Krause, 2008)
4. Self-Determination (Novel)

# Privacy Utility Trade-off Optimization




Low Objective Function Value High

# Universal Selection: A Selected Mechanism




# Data Flow: Universal Selection



# From Universal to Heterogeneous Selections

Self-Determination: Individuals select autonomously  
Influence on privacy-utility trade-offs?

# Data Flow: Heterogeneous Selections



# Heterogeneous Selections

Analytically and experimentally proven:


*“The aggregation of masked values using different masking mechanisms, approximates the aggregation of all actual values.”*

$$g\left(\bigcup_i \mathbb{M}_i\right) = g(\mathbb{S}) + \delta, \delta \rightarrow 0$$

# Experimental Settings


- Real World data: **6,435** users in **536** days
- **165,559,680** sensor values
- Over **20,000** privacy settings
- Multiple Repetitions per experiment for statistical significance
- Over **200,000** experiments
- Over 1 real world month of Euler runtime

# Experimental Evaluation




Masking Mechanism	Privacy	Utility
A	0.01	0.99
B	0.20	0.98
C	0.40	0.84
D	0.60	0.76
E	0.80	0.68
N (No Masking)	0.00	1.00

# Results



(a) Privacy Median




(c) Utility Median

# Conclusions

- Privacy and utility can be optimized and personalized
- Measurable trade-offs between privacy and utility
- Analytical, empirical and experimental evidence that heterogeneous privacy setting selection is feasible

# Questions







## Backup Slides

Just in case

# Privacy-Utility Dispersion



(b) Privacy IQR



(d) Utility IQR

## How noise is generated

For sum-related aggregations:

noise  $\varepsilon_i$  sampled from symmetric distribution around zero,

For example in differential privacy, the noise is generated via a Laplace distribution.

$$\varepsilon = L(\theta), \quad \theta = \{\mu = 0, \beta\}.$$

# Privacy Metric

$$q = \alpha_1 \frac{\mu(\mathcal{E}_{\eta,k})}{\max(\mu(\mathcal{E}_{\eta,k}))} + \alpha_2 \frac{\sigma(\mathcal{E}_{\eta,k})}{\max(\sigma(\mathcal{E}_{\eta,k}))} + \alpha_3 \frac{H(\mathcal{E}_{\eta,k})}{\max(H(\mathcal{E}_{\eta,k}))}$$

# Local Error

$$\epsilon_{n,t} = \left| \frac{f_{\eta}(s_{n,t}, \theta_{\eta,k}) - s_{n,t}}{s_{n,t}} \right|$$

# Global Error

$$\epsilon_t = \left| \frac{g(M_t) - S_t}{g(S_t)} \right|$$

# Utility Metric

$$u = 1 - \left( \gamma_1 \frac{\mu(\epsilon_{\eta,k})}{\max(\mu(\epsilon_{\eta,k}))} + \gamma_2 \frac{\sigma(\epsilon_{\eta,k})}{\max(\sigma(\epsilon_{\eta,k}))} + \gamma_3 \frac{H(\epsilon_{\eta,k})}{H(\max(\epsilon_{\eta,k}))} \right)$$

## Example of Harvard References

According to scientists, the Sun is pretty big.\*

The Moon, however, is not so big.\*

- [Miller 2005]^ E. Miller, The Sun, (New York: Academic Press, 2005), 23-5.
- [Smith 1978]^ R. Smith, "Size of the Moon", Scientific American, 46 (April 1978): 44-6.



## References and Sources

## Selected Related Literature

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